unimportant. "The essential function of the intellectual elite," wrote the French theoretician Paul de Rousiers on the eve of the war, "is to see things as they are.'" How far these great men of letters, as a part of that elite, measured up to the injunction will be seen.
I
In modem France the paths between journalism and politics have been well travelled and worn. Bureaucracy and literature have many times drawn on the Same sources. More especially is this true of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and literature. This union, however, never meant that questions of external policy found their way easily into poetry, the novel, or the theatre. Naturally the man of letters, even if closely connected with practical affairs and dependent upon them for his livelihood, scarcely made of them the end of his art. He had indeed, as Leon Daudet once remarked, "a much more developed sense of his place in society and of its independence than, for example, the doctor."2 Certainly in the critical years from 1911 to 1914 the literary intellectuals demonstrated this sense of their position and independence. But it was also true that increasingly with the descent to war they demonstrated a real interest in the fateful trend of international politics-however varied and detached this might be. "Leaving aside pure aesthetics," wrote Regis M ichaud, "and art for art's sake, French literature in that period was largely the product of historical events. '" Beneath the surface of what in retrospect and nostalgia appeared to be the last Golden Age, Europe was shifting angrily. Paul H azard said that the French nation had begun to choose what it must do and what ideas it must accept as early as 1900. He said that people came then to see that certain ideas might be fine and generous, but that they were also out of harmony with the times. Ceaselessly on the eastern frontiers, in Africa, and in the Near East the threat from the German Empire appeared to be growing. Hence there was registered in the world of letters a very definite change of spirit. And yet, continued Hazard, there were no hard and fast categories, no real schools: the individual was supreme. Hostile or indifferent to politics on the national level, the young and the no longer young writers came to be concerned with French problems and with finding a cure for what was widely regarded as a new "decadence." Following the lead given by Bedier, Lanson, and Bergson, they tended to participate in the general "melee des idees." With the new century a reaction had set in against the rarefied intellectualism of the post-1870 years when patriotism had fallen to its nadir in the disillusionment of overwhelming military defeat and institutional revolution. Now the time had passed when a writer like Remy de Gourmont could remark that he would not give the little finger of either hand for Alsace-Lorraine because he needed one to write and the other to flick the ash off his cigarette"
And yet it was nevertheless true that those who troubled themselves very seriously with the affairs of the world were few; those who did so in any important way, a mere handful. Moreover, the men who were mentally or even actively involved in the problems of the time never saw eye to eye on politics, whether internal or external. Daniel Halevy, for instance, showed his essential contempt for politics by voting only once in his life before 1919, while Maurice Barres sathowever silently-in the Chamber of Deputies. And although all of them linked it intimately with the international politics of the great Powers, they were profoundly divided in their views of the contemporary European crisis. Thus the years following the first decade of the twentieth century witnessed a struggle between those who approached the problems of the western state system from a primarily nationalist point of view and those who sought to encourage thought and action on a wider plane. Inevitably, perhaps, the dynamics of the crisis into which Europe had worked itself favoured the arguments and activity of the former.
The writers discussed here could scarcely be forced into an arbitrary classification, but it is possible to see a deep cleavage between the ideas of Anatole France and Romain Rolland on the one hand, and those of Maurice Barres or Charles Peguy on the other. The first two, however different they might be, preached a doctrine of international detente. The latter two advocated what must be called a militant "forward" policy for their country, which did not, for many and complex reasons, place the simple maintenance of peace before all other things. Even this generalized attempt at a classification, of course, tends to obscure similarities and dissimilarities. In his own way Peguy was at least as convinced a socialist as Rolland ever was. Between the narrow irredentism of Barres and Peguy's noble search for an ultimate justice there was a vast, unbridgeable gulf. Perhaps, too, it is doing some violence to all of these men to strip away their words on the international order, on war and peace, from the totality of their thought and writing. But on these matters their views are on record; they are positive, and it is these and not the whole man that are in question. More than that, if the twentieth century has learnt anything at all, it is that there is a case to be made for holding the artist, the intellectual, responsible for his attitudes toward and effect upon the society which he serves and which also serves him.
II
Looking back many years after the turmoil had passed away, Rolland could say that he had never mixed in politics at all before 1914. "Until that time," he wrote two decades after the outbreak at Sarajevo, "I was permeated with the ideology of my time and class, . . . the ideology of abstract man, detached (then they said liberated ) from the contingencies of political and social life. It would not have seemed worthy for a writer to have concerned himself with it." Such a statement cannot, however, be taken quite at face value. In fact, R olland had devoted years to what was perhaps the central problem of French foreign policy, the German question. True enough, he did not touch upon it directly and politically. H e filled no official office; he served no government. But even the romantic and foggy pages of his vast Jean Christophe must have earned the strictures of the critic Julien Benda, attacking as early as 1912 (long before he achieved fame with L a Trahison des clercs) "the eternal pretension of mystics to be at the sam e time doctors, ... of those who worship to be at the same time those who understand, ... of those who act to be at the same time those who explain.'" If, then, any writer could make the claim which Rolland made for himself, it was not he but Benda.
Indeed, such ill-defined humanist values as R olland subscribed to awoke no response in this critic of the intellectuals. This man was little troubled by the day to day business of the external world. He revolted against what he called "the fury of the irrational and the instinctive" in those famous "professors of action," Barres, Peguy, or Georges Sorel. In his view, mankind was divided into two equally necessary but entirely distinctive categories, perhaps what the Germans call Tatm enschen. and Denkmenschen, and he believed that their confusion would be disastrous to each of them. The man of letters was ill advised to try to cross the line. Yet Benda admitted that on at least one occasion he himself had betrayed his values. He had not always been "a perfect intellectual" before 1914 6 Certainly, however, he had never shown an active interest in political affairs that was in any way comparable to that of a writer like Anatole France. For France took a passionate interest in these things. Internationalist, socialist, and patriot, the critic of diplomats and foreign ministers and that capitalist economic structure which he condemned for giving them their being, he thought and said a good deal about the world around him. He prided himself upon his knowledge and analysis of the practical world; his judgments were direct and unsparing.' But in the long run, for all his thought and study, Anatole France totally misjudged the state of Europe. Like most of those about him, he knew in reality very little of the forces at work. The war, when it came, was to prove him to have been vastly wrong.
But it was never the peculiar mark of the literary intellectual to be cautious in discussing the complexities of foreign affairs. For the ways of international diplomacy, Peguy, for example, had no great respect at all. In his mind it seemed clear enough that war was the great and final settler of disputes. He said one had only to look toward the trouble-racked Balkans, caught up in revolution against Turkish rule and civil war before 1914, to see this point illustrated. His friends and critics afterward hastened to explain that judgments upon Peguy here ought not to be hasty. He and his disciple, Ernest Psichari, they said, were never concerned with the political power, international station, and military strength of France, but only with her destiny and spiritual reality, what Jacques Maritain termed "the miracle Ires replie that lives in her." This was true. But the truth of the statement could not disguise the plain fact that for Peguy and Psi chari the way to their spiritual journey's end lay across the rough uncompromising wastes of politics, diplomacy, and war-at least in part. Searching for some vague and mystic personal fulfilment in the African desert, after the surrender hy France in 1911 of a part of her equatorial territory to Germany in return for a free political hand in Morocco, the young officer Psichari wrote to POguy that "we should not have to be given too much free rein in order to go to Tchad and take back my beloved Sangha from the Prussians."· The statement was typical enough. Psi chari served in the army, and whether he liked it or not the army dealt very much in earthly power and shed human blood for earthly ends. All that, and Psichari's recognition of it, could never be argued and explained away.
Or there was Barres, incomparably less complicated in his ambitions, far more directly critical of the failure of French literature to concern itself with the dominant political problems of the time. To him the Moroccan negotiations of 1911, by which Germany and France had settled their African conflict peacefully after leading Europe to the brink of war, spelled out two vital requisites for the country: "Revision of the constitution and preparation for war."· With Barres there were no very subtle mystical overtones. What he demanded was nakedly evident. That was his particular distinction. But, in fact, he was little different from the others. None of the writers here considered was able to approach the difficulties of policy and diplomacy as problems of practical statesmanship. Impatient or contemptuous of the daily diplomatic round, their minds worked tangentially, and, as it were, upon another plane.
No one swept aside the complications of the western state system more readily, completely, and unthinkingly than Rolland. No one was to reveal himself with the coming of the war more nearly totally confused by the whole subject. Unerringly, as he liked to think, he had sped to the heart of the matter by erecting what he called his "span over the Rhine connecting Germany and France and showing them to be complementary." He had tried to demonstrate to his generation that in reality there was no international problem at all unless it was that universal problem of human beings learning how to know and love one another. "My poor dear fellow," Olivier cried to Jean Christophe, "what do you know of France? ... You haven't seen a single Frenchman. A group of debauchees, a few beasts of pleasure, who are not even French, men-about-town, politicians, useless creatures, all the fun and flimmery which passes over and above the life of the nation without even touching it. . . . You do not know the people, you do not know the elite . ... I do not blame you: how could you? Why, France is hardly at all known to the French. The best of us are bound down and held captive to our native soil." And yet it was all too obvious, as Rolland's critic Daniel Halevy put it, that such extraordinary people as Olivier and Jean Christophe were nothing but pale, idealized replicas of their fellow nationals, incapable of building a new and peaceful Europe.'· Dreams and sentimental idealism were the foundation beneath Rolland's passionately unreal analysis of international politics. " 'Ah!' Olivier would sigh. 'How difficult it is to understand each other!' 'But is it necessary always to understand each other?' Christophe would ask. 'I give it up. We need only to love each other.' " Inevitably Rolland hated all that was represented by people like Barres and the literary clique surounding Action Franfaise, Charles Maurras, Leon Daudet, and their friends. War, Rolland wrote in his journal in August, 1914, was in fact the bankruptcy of all civilizations, and the word patrie simply "a blood-stained idol." War, he noted again in the famous open letter to Gerhart Hauptmann that same disastrous month, "springs from the weakness and stupidity of nations. One cannot feel resentment against them for it; one can only pity them." What particularly shocked him, he said, as the summer lights went out all over Europe, was the degree of unanimity for war which he observed, or thought he observed, in every nation. "An epidemic of homicidal fury which started in T okyo ten years ago," he wrote, "has spread like a wave and overflowed the whole world. A sort of demoniacal irony broods over this conflict of the nations, from which, whatever its result, only a mutilated Europe can emerge."ll Thus the rebuffed, disillusioned intellectual came to take his exalted stand "above the battle." But a critic who so fiercely attacked the bankruptcy and weakness of men and nations marching off to slaughter each other might first have taken the trouble to make certain that his own record had been unwaveringly pacific before challenging the massed intelligence of a continent. This, in fact, Rolland could never have done. His record here was not unbroken. As Georg Brandes pointed out at the time, "Even Romain Rolland approved of war and awaited it with confidence." Possibly this was an overstatement, but there was an element of truth in the severe indictment. It was to be buried and lost sight of by the later writings and actions. Only in the correspondence with his friend Louis Gillet, published some thirty-five years later, did it come to light. "Yes," Rolland had written on July 30, 1914, "the spirit of insolence and depredation of the two German monarchies calls for punishment. Will it come? I hope so, not only for France, but for Germany herself whose best idealistic forces are crushed."12 If this, to put the best possible construction upon it, was no more than a momentary slip, it was at the very least questionable to what extent Rolland had ever attempted to think through the problems of nationalism, war, and peace. Between the two worlds of fictional dreams and international politics the artist might not so happily and simply voyage. At all events, the gentler spirits of J ean Christophe and Olivier seemed momentarily to have expired in the heat of the July crisis, only to be born again from the olympian heights of neutral Switzerland, "au dessus de la melee."
More of a patriot and less of an easy optimist, Anatole France knew that the quarrels of Europe were not so simply transcended. This much, however little he comprehended the real course of events, was plain. Believing that war and religion were the two paramount calamities responsible for most of mankind's unhappiness, he refused to admit that any whole people deliberately wished to fight another. Not men but capitalism was to blame for war. That nations had the right and duty to defend themselves he never doubted. But all his former illusions concerning the universal benefits derived from war had been sloughed off. Gone, too, in these years just preceding the first war were older dreams that mankind might improve its fate by improving itself. Peace, in his view, was to be had only tbrough a new order of things, a new science, new economic necessities. The new society would impose peace as the old had inflicted war. But he knew that all this would not come about tomorrow. Contemporary France he attacked as being run by immoral capitalists, peopled by a race of thoughtless children. He said once to Paul Gsell that he did not believe the bourgeoisie would ever succeed in winning over the "good people" of France to their chauvinist position; but for the most part his outlook was utterly gloomy. For mankind as a whole he expressed "a little admiration and much pity," but he could not feel sure that other beings might not rise out of "the ashes and ruins of what once was man and his genius."" Thus the socialist outlook appeared to offer no short-term comfort and not even a long-term certainty of better things to come. True believers, however, like Lucien Herr, the scholarly adviser and fri end of Jean Jaures, clung to their dogmas and simply denied that war would be permitted to break out." Lacking this inner faith of the librarian of the Ecole N ormale, Anatole France, who knew relatively little and probably cared not very much more Other writers in France were far better adjusted to the realities of the international breakdown. The philosophies of Paul Bourget, Psichari, Peguy, or Barres differed completely from those of the idealists who became so bitterly disillusioned by humanity. To Bourget it was clear that the restoration of his country to her former place in the world could bring back the brilliant era which had ended with the collapse of the Second Empire, and that if Frenchmen had the will, this restoration was possible. More plainly, Barre. demanded a return to the old martial spirit and an intensified preparation for war: the military ideal was the sole measure of a people. On the other hand, in Psichari's mind this military ideal invoked by Barre. appeared to have been sublimated to the point where it existed for itself alone. The military mystique became necessary to a nation even it if was opposed to the principles on which that nation had been founded. "The day when we lose our fine foolishiness," he wrote in 1913, "we shall not be worth very much, and this whole people will suffer from our particular downfall."l5 But for all the mysticism involved here, this was the voice of the soldier, not the philosopher-citizen. It was evident that the ideal could not live quietly and alone. Without a constant rededication in battle even a military ideal must die.
Literary men of this stamp were prone to strip war of its less pleasant, more obvious aspects. They were pleased to reveal it as a crusade in the cause of a vanquished people or a purified ideal; or, as in the case of Peguy, of both. Peguy knew that war was not made by capitalists and governments alone. He knew and said that it came out of the people. Both Benda and Rolland, his critics and admirers, remarked that the disembodied spirit of war, the ideal of discarnate militarism, was foremost in Peguy's thought. But Rolland also noted that Peguy invariably "succeeded in making heaven march with his land, his country, his passions."" In him the military ideal was so wedded to the conception of a Franco-German war that the ideal could not meaningfully be considered apart from the international reality. More- over, if this had not been the case, there would have been no point to Benda's charge that although they served France well, the group around Peguy and his bookshop on the Rue de la Sorbonne would be severely judged and found wanting by intellectual history.
The differences marking off these groups of writers from each other, then, were real and important. And where for Rolland or Anatole France the idea of peace was the primary consideration, for Barres or Bourget it was the idea of France reborn to greatness in a struggle with evil. Only Benda carried to its extreme the cult of a disembodied idea. "What matters to me," he would write many years after the war, "is not a few human lives. It is the triumph of a principle."!7
III
Apart from this high priest of disinterested intellectualism, remote until the last hours of the peace from European problems, all these writers came to centre their attention on the capital matter of relations with the German Empire. Their appreciation of the complications of the rival alliance systems, however, was the slightest. For Rolland all the tragedy of this prolonged antagonism was implicit in the ignorance of the two peoples of one another. He thought the Alsace-Lorraine issue could be argued equally well on either side. For the Germans he could feel no hatred; other peoples had done as bad or worse, and France herself would not have been more generous in victory. Vet it seemed to him that this tragic conflict would drag on forever and the flower of European civilization be swallowed up in it. To his mind it seemed clear that this one territorial, and indeed all problems would be dispelled, were the peoples given a voice. How to give them that voice was the eternal, unresolved puzzle. All that was certain was that until it had been solved, the peoples would be only "the unthinking echo which casts back the snarling cries of the Press and the defiance of their leaders, and swells them into the Marseillaise or the Wacht am Rhein."18
Like the pacifists and internationalists, the militants reduced all international politics to the German problem. None was more forthright than Barres. Some of his commentators have ingeniously tried to show that actually he had always wished to avoid poisoning FrancoGerman relations, and had hoped for a secret accord. But if ever there was a time when he distinguished between Germany and Prussia, that time lay still in the future. France, he said in the troubled summer of 1911, was committed to "the eternal struggle of Germandom and the lTBenda, Un reg.rdier, 50, 147. '.Rolland, lean Ch, islophe, II, 326, 447, 448, 449. Latin world. It is a conflict of feeling and thought: laws, religions, histories and philosophies oppose one another. It is also a battle between man and man." The lost provinces were always the issue. "You know," he told an audience in Metz that same summer, "that in France we are profoundly divided on all subjects .... But if it is a question of you, there is only one feeling, a single voice, one people." That Alsace-Lorraine must return he never doubted. The peace was merely "a forty years armistice." What he feared most for France was a reorientation of her policy toward rapprochement with Germany. His public life was dedicated to the proposition that France would never forget and must one day claim her own. He could understand no other point of view, no other programme. Seeing Jaures lying dead by an assassin's bullet on the eve of war, he reflected only that "he had a voice strong enough to have given the lead to an era, but he thought and acted ·under foreign influence. He believed he was defending the French working class, but he had shut himself up in German thought." For Barres there was no other meaning in this now extinguished life. The man's patriotism he had not doubted, and because of it, he told Maurice Paleologue in July, 1913, he did not attack Jaures. "In my opinion," he added, "Jaures is a bishop who took the wrong road, and that is what compels him to keep very bad company." Patriotism was not enough. It would never restore France. In a certain sense, then, it was true, as Albert Thibaudet put it, that the war of 1914 was Barres' war.'· For him the recovery of the greatness which fell so far in 1870-1 had always been the alpha and omega of a realistic foreign policy. And such a policy could only end in war.
The war of 1914 was not on that account any the less Pe"guy's war. The first Moroccan crisis of 1905 had awakened him to the German threat. He was in no sense depressed by it. From then until the coming of the war he campaigned against the external danger and the internal weakness with the cry, "We are ... a sacrificed generation. We have been constantly betrayed by our masters and our leaders. At no price will we suffer our children to be betrayed in their turn by the same masters and leaders." His own wanare with the anti-militarist elements in France was unrelenting and violent. His famous strictures on the Sorbonne and the Ecole Normale were largely irrational and personally motivated. These schools and the scholars in them, such as Lucien Herr and Ernest Lavisse, he took as the symbol of all he loathed in the Third Republic: its sickly pacifism, its attachment to German scholarship, and not least its slighting of himself. Over against them he set up the ideal of military France, young, vigorous, dedicated to the pursuit of order and justice. "Whether the Sorbonne wills it or no," he wrote, "it is the French soldier who measures its ground. It is the French soldier and the 75 cannon and temporal force that have staked out, that have measured, that measure constantly the amount of land where French is spoken .... "
Contemporary pacifism and socialism Peguy declared to be in the service of German imperialism. Free speech in time of peace he would never deny, but "In time of war there is only one policy, and that is the policy of the National Convention .... It is Jaures in a tumbril and a roll of drums to cover that great voice." Time and again he called the socialist leader a Pan-Germanist. For Peguy, Germandom was symbolical of evil everywhere in the world, and the lost provinces were the symbols of a great betrayal and of an imminent justice. "The root of my thought on the question of Alsace-Lorraine," he said, "is that I am not angry with the Prussians for having taken them. I am angry with those miserable Frenchmen who betrayed them." Moreover, he objected to the lyrical terms in which the provinces were spoken . of. The question was not to speak of them but to free them. And this could never be done peacefully" In the state of pre-1914 Europe, as Peguy saw it, the search for justice on the international level could be carried through successfully only by a just war.
It was evident, then, that with their eyes fixed firmly upon the humiliation of 1870--1 or some utopian city of brotherly love, the literary intellectuals had little hard thought (or the international role of the French state. Rolland prided himself on escaping the mental paralysis induced by the national cult. His thought on the outbreak of the First World Waf, he said, was for the cause of civilization, not for France alone. And this being the case, he could scarcely have troubled himself greatly about so insular a matter as French policy. Daniel Halcvy remarked that Rolland produced nothing but dreams, reflecting "the after-glow of the much-loved, still near nineteenth century. He awoke memories and echoes of Michelet, Ruskin, Tolstoy, striking chords of sincerely moving quality. He stirred the ashes of a tired hearth and made one last flame to flicker." But if Rolland awoke memories and echoes of that century, it was with the ideals of another that he liked to identify himself. "I was a good European," he wrote toward the close of his life, "a republican with advanced Socialist sympathles, an internationalist at heart, and, as they said in the eighteenth century, a 'citizen of the world.' " 21 It was the faiIing of men such as Rolland, or even Anatole France (who may indeed have had a "profound grasp of economic conditions and the events of universal history,"" hut who certainly misjudged the world around him) that they were incapable of relating, or unwilling to relate, their hopes and visions to the unavoidable exigencies of the European scene. On the other hand, their criticisms of those writers who saw the world very differently were in large part justified. That Peguy and Barres confused France with civilization and grew narrower and more militant in their purposes as they advanced toward 1914 could not be doubted. Thus the final failure of those few literary intellectuals who identified their themes most closely with the FrancoGerman quarrel was to deal with it primarily as a problem to be solved either by a complete, unhistorical, unreal break with an inescapable past, or as a spiritual abstraction, a worldly manifestation of a cosmic struggle, involving an ineluctable fatality. The French nation as a political entity among other political entities grouped in a system susceptible to organization by negotiation had little or no meaning for them.
IV
All of them understood that a great European war was approaching. At least, they came to believe in its approach, some fearing it, some quite frankly hoping for it. Perhaps some of them, like Rolland, had never really pondered what war would mean until it was upon them. Vet Rolland's mind was filled with a brooding fear. "I have written," he said at the conclusion of Jean Christophe, "the tragedy of a generation which is nearing its end." He felt that the whole world was waiting for the inevitable. Rule everywhere was by the mediocre; only a Napoleon could have saved the peace. "The force of the human mind was in other things. So there was nothing to be done but to trust to the declivity down which they were moving." Publicly he later chose to ignore having shared this deeply pessimistic conviction. "It is not," he wrote to Hauptmann, "that I regard, as you do, war as a fatality. A Frenchman does not believe in fatality. Fatality is the excuse of souls without a will." But fatality was also the ultimate conviction of souls without the power to arrest events. And such souls belonged to French men of letters in the last futile years of the peace"" This sense of total hopelessness was shared finally even by Anatole France. The years when he had praised war as the sole reconciliation between man's innate brutality and the ideal of justice were behind him. Now he spoke against the extension of military service in France, attacked the capitalist creators of war, set aside even his faith in a socialist economic revolution, and suggested that human history had run its course?' It almost seemed as if the international idea had been found wanting without ever being tried, that only the military, national, French ideal successfully responded to the challenges of the European crisis. The prophets of a better world were retreating in despair. Only those who could look catastrophe in the face and not be appalled, accepting it as a necessary trial, were in harmony with the spirit that was abroad in the France of President Raymond Poincare.
They were the real "maitres de I'heure."
Such were Barres, Peguy, Psi chari. Whether or not they placed action before understanding in their scale of values, they wished for, and in the event they welcomed, the opportunity for action against Germany. For them the tension and uncertainty of the armed peace were painful. "I shall never resign myself," wrote Barres, "to the fact that after 1871 France was not constituted like a Sparta, subordinating everything to the recreation of her glory and territory." He said no responsible man would state that he wished war, but in fact his own speeches and writings demanded just this, with fire or a simulated note of the tragic. Those who knew him well had no doubt where his train of thought finally led. "In the ardour of his Lorraine nationalism," commented PaJeologue, the hrilliant and enigmatic political director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "he wishes war because he sees in it the sole means of regenerating France and recovering our lost provinces." Equally convinced of the approach of war, Paleologue did not, however, feel it either possible or necessary to make the conduct of policy more enterprising and daring. Barres agreed: their functions were different. Paleologue at the helm could not afford to display bad seamanship, but "I have given myself the task of keeping public 
opinion healthy."
This self-imposed responsibility ended in August, 1914 , and the circumstances were probably better for France than Barres could have hoped. As Thibaudet remarked, "That was the destiny he dreamed of, toward which his winding paths led him. The man of letters became /' homme drapeau. The whole of France was a bastion de l' Est. Poincare donned again the cap with oak leaves, and Barres assumed spiritual power." In fact, of course, it was not in Barres' nature to permit himself openly to display this triumph. He played his part quietly to the end, recording in his journal with a characteristically romantic flourish, "Head up high, jaw thrust forward, somehow in good heart, we are entering the tragic region." 25 More mystic yet more direct than Barres, the young Psichari drove toward a similar goal, convinced that his generation was destined to rescue France and civilization, finding glory and revanche along the way. "It seems to me," he wrote to Henri Massis in 1913, Hthat the young people sense vaguely that they will see great things, that great things will be done by them. They will be neither dilettantes nor sceptics. They will not be tourists through this life. They know what is expected of them .... It seems to me that all the traits you note must one day lead us to military glory and, to speak plainly, to a revanche from which we must never shift our attention." Bitterly he assailed the Republic for its crimes against patriotism and the army, arguing relentlessly for a return to more martial ways. War was the core of his mystique, the Franco-German struggle merely the frame within which he acted out his part. And finally he saw it all come about as he had hoped. "We are certainly going forward to great victories," he wrote to his mother a few day before his death in August, 1914, "and I repent less than ever having desired the war which was necessary for the honour and greatness of France. It has come at the right time and in the right way. May Providence not abandon us in this great and magnificent adventure."'· War had always been the necessary fulfihnent for himself and his country. He had never thought to clothe it in other than military terms. In this respect he differed from Paul Bourget, who maintained that war and military servitude were no religion but rather the penalty for living this earthly life. "A law as mysterious as it is univen;ai," he remarked to Emile Boutroux early in 1914, "wills that war, this bloody trial, be the inevitable form of that constraint which individuals, like nations, must suffer" in a world which was a jungle and where all men were hunters and hunted."' A philosophy as fatalist and as war-seeking as Psichari's, Bourget's was far cruder and far less profoundly rooted in the spirit. It was utterly remote from the complexities that moved the mind of peguy. The reasons why Peguy sought war have been endlessly debated. Emmanuel Mounier said he was no militarist but a man influenced by his service, the pomp of public display, the idea of the army as free from monetary corruption, by the love of order, offence and victory, by a hatred of parliamentarism and a pacifism which placed peace before justice. Perhaps it was true that the issue of peace or war was "merely incidental" to the problem of justice in his private world, and that if he advocated a just war, he nevertheless wished for the war to end all wars?' But it is clear that Peguy said many things and that they need not and cannot all be reconciled. "We are leaving, soldiers of the Republic," were his words that final August, "for the general disarmament and the last of wars. We have not sinned. We have not failed." But not so many years before this he had celebrated death for the things of the earth, for land, hearth, and home, "provided it was in a just war." Perhaps not the last of wars, but the just war in the just cause was his primary concern. Certainly he admired struggle for itself. Yet it seems untrue, as some have argued, to conclude that neither victory, defeat, nor determined purpose worried him-for he h ad qualified struggle with the phrase "for the safety of all." Nor could it be said that in his mind human conflict was a simple act of the Christian faith, because he had written H eureux qui sont morts pour des cites charnelles Car enes sont les corps de la cite de Dieu"· Yet, as Romain Rolland pointed out, it was the essence of Peguy's thought to unite order, grace, and freedom, the Christian destiny and the destiny of France. Doubtless an ultimate justice in the City of God was the real goal, but Peguy saw the road leading across the temporal trials of the chosen French people. He had long since concluded that the political and military struggles with their neighbours were bllt a stage on the journey to the heavenly city of justice. Sustained by the certainty that the mission of France was not unblessed, heartened by what he took after 1911 to be "a profound and violent French renaissance," he watched matters develop with a certain calm. " I do not see things blackly," he told Joseph Lotte in September, 1912 . "What is bad is parliamentarism; but parliamentarism doesn't spoil all. People have been working hard for five years. Right now we have a quite remarkable Ministry [that of Raymond Poincare). In no other European country will you find so many men of front rank."Sl War was coming, as Halevy put it, and increasingly Peguy longed for it. Only this overdue and necessary conflict with Germany could bring justice, resurrection, and glory once more to the land of France, which was, as he quite simply put it, God's Eldest Daughter. Secure in this faith, he left the Rue de Ia Sorbonne, marched eastward as a common soldier, and gave up his life in September, 1914.
H cureux qui sont morts dans les gran des batailles
Couches dessus Ie sol a face de Dieu. S2 The conclusion is inescapable that among the men of letters the movement was toward the strong nationalist viewpoint when foreign affairs were in question. Julien Benda watched with a kind of horror while "the fury of the irrational and the instinctive" was translated from H enri Bergson's class-room in the College de France into the literary world, which then proceeded to dedicate itself to the cult of the French soul and French "truths." In fact, the Dreyfus Affai. as a literary debate was not so much forgotten as merged in and overshadowed by the bitter dispute of which Alsace-Lorraine had become the dominant symbol. The critic Victor Giraud said he did not think the importance of the provinces for either the older or the younger generation could be exaggerated. "Those who began life as I did," wrote Bourget, "at the time of the terrible disaster, hear always in their ears the sound of German sabres dragging over the cobblestones of our streets." Certainly in the calculated morbidity with which the provinces were surrounded every reference was virtually a call to action. A fantastic romanticism settled down upon them. "This cemetery," declared Paul Acker early in 1914, "does not, like other cemeteries, contain lifeless bodies, but all of lost A1sace and all the crumbled greatness of France." In short, forty years of silence and brooding retirement were drawing to their close, and French literature heralded the renewed contest by celebrating the virtues of the West defending its culture against the Barbarians. 33 Some like Octave Mirbeau might not believe in the coming of war, but they were not many. "It seems to me," remarked Paul Hervieu to Maurice Paleologue, "we are going there on the run." For his part, Louis Gillet was scandalized by the spectacle of Frenchmen debating whether or not to increase the period of military service from two to three years. Germany he loved with all his heart, he said, but the long armed peace was too much to be borne any more. Therefore he would he "awfully happy to go and fight her." He thought idealists like J aUfeS were fine and noble, and he felt a keen sympathy for those who sought to hold back with mere words the forward march of the world's destinies. But peace would never be preserved by generous ideas. The world had to be delivered from the Germans. The gentlest artists, far removed from the intricate confusions of international politics, knew that.·' Thus there arose a chorus for one decisive liberating war when the right time should come.
Undoubtedly many writers were swept along in the nationalist upsurge originating in the great metropolitan press, in Parliament, and in the government-sponsored "renaissance" of the last years of the peace. Most of them can have had no idea what the violent dislocation of the armed peace would finally mean for their country. Some few may have been prepared for a lengthy war, but where the younger military men were preaching the virtues of lightning attack and a decisive first battle of encounter no literary man was in a position to calculate effectively the possibilities stretching ahead. Not many in any walk of life foresaw the character of twentieth-century wars of attrition. Some writers took the attitude expressed by a young intellectual to Julien Benda: "War, why not? It would be entertaining."" Thoughts and motives, here as always, must have been confused. Any analysis inevitably stops short of the ultimate. What fired the mind of Paul Bourget was not the same thing as that which kindled the crusading flame within Ernest Psichari. All roads might lead to Rome, but the points of departure were vastly different, and in the long run every route was unique.
The one property common to all these writers was a small body of knowledge concerning politics among the nations. It was neither detailed nor exact. It had filtered down to them through untold newspaper and personal reports; it was the product of guesswork, superficial observation, partisanship, and wilful distortion. It did not exclude a great deal of truth. But the secrets of embassies, courts, and ministries were as inaccessible to Anatole France as to Charles peguy. Most probably it was the vaguest of sentimentalities which propelled Romain Rolland across the stem realities of the forty years' quarrel; and the intellectual's barely conscious hope of a front seat at Annageddon'" as much as anything else, that sustained Maurice Barres in his ceaseless vigil on the eastern approaches. V Plainly French foreign policy was not founded on such subjective principles of thought and action as these men possessed. But how far did they influence contemporary thought in France? How great was the impact of their views on the inevitability or the desirability of war? At most, they were limited to an indirect power over the minds of people and government. Stephen Zweig told Rolland in 1912 that he had done more to bring French and German youth together with his Jean Christophe than all the societies and diplomats put together. But it was a fact that Rolland himself felt more at ease beyond the borders of France than within them, and he was better appreciated outside of his native land. It is virtually impossible to measure the repercussion of anyone writer on a generation. Anatole France's pessimistic views were the very negation of all the official high optimism of the Poincare period, yet he was very much read among the younger generation. The brooding belliciste Barres was called "the god" of the youthful elite that went to war in 1914. Peguy and Charles Maurras were placed in the front rank of popularity, and Henri Massis said that it was the soldier Psichari who gave meaning to "an age without an horizon and without honour."37 Massis's judgments, however, have not always gone without challenge. The inquiry into the political and social views of educated youth which he and Alfred de Tarde undertook in 1912 was scarcely representative, and its conclusions were far more militant than warranted. 88 Looking back, many years after the war had been fought and won, one of those who had been young ber ore the storm could not recall the total predominance or the military note. Life had not been all one long pilgrimage to the black-draped Strasbourg statue in the Place de la Concorde. "No," wrote Jean Guehenno, "if I think again of those pre-war years, I find in myself no feeling that disaster is coming .... Not for a minute did we have the idea that we could be those who soon must die."" Evidently not all the youth of France was moved by the mysticism of Psichari to march in the national parade. And yet if Guehenno and his friends had no premonitions of disaster, it was because there were few who saw the terrible connection linking war and disaster. No one, however young and thoughtless, on the other hand, could have failed to see the shadows on the land and hear the approaching thunder. Certainly no one who exposed himself to contemporary literature.
So far as international affairs were concerned, then, two main currents ran through the literary life of the French Republic before 1914. Their precise strengths will never be known. But it is sure that the stronger stream flowed toward the militant nationalist position. These men of letters were deeply divided and in no way adequately informed about the international role of France. They were inclined to judge external affairs from subjective, doctrinal positions. For the most part, they had no understanding of the enonnous forces working in the western state system. And in the long run they were carried along by the impetus of events they barely understood. In a spirit of despair, bitterness, hatred, or impatience, they prophesied and awaited the war they had come to regard as inevitable.
Writing in late 1913, Victor Giraud rejected criticisms of the literary intellectuals on other than literary grounds. Politics, he said, could concern them only accidentally, and it was not their ideas on politics which should be judged. If this were so, then they belonged to a rare and privileged body of men whose irresponsibility as members of an advanced society had few parallels. But if they were accountable, and if it was indeed, as De Rousiers had argued, the function of the intellectual "to see things as they are," then it must be concluded that these men failed to think through in any serious way the problems of international politics. In their several ways they helped to prepare a great nation psychologically for a struggle which may indeed have been thrust upon it. Pierre Lasserre argued that they had greatly contributed to the eventual victory.'· This was so. In the light of 1914-18 such a service was quickly seen and appreciated. Another question, however, might have been put concerning their role before 1914. To it no satisfactory answer could have been given. How this struggle might have been avoided they had not had the slightest concrete notion. Wh~re to look for alternatives to the deadlocked alliance systems they did not know. In this, of course, they were no different from the vast mass of their contemporaries in every station. But many of them came to rationalize the approaching collapse of the international order in the name of civilization and the resurgence of France. A great and tragic sense of having lost all control over the issue of war and peace, if not of the national destiny, characterized almoot all the literary intellectuals while Europe was still at peace and the die not cast. And from them in part this sense of fatality must finally have communicated itself to the people, waiting patiently for some unknown fate to scatter their lives across the battlefields of an old continent.
